## The IPCO X Summer School
The
3rd Summer School on Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
will be held at The
idea of a
summer school immediately preceding the IPCO meeting was introduced at
the occasion of IPCO
VIII in Please visit the IPCO X program page for a schedule and other details. ## Lectures## Joan FeigenbaumComputer Science
Department, ## Incentives and Internet ComputationTraditional
treatments of distributed computation typically assume nodes to be
either cooperative (i.e., they execute the prescribed algorithm) or
Byzantine (i.e., they can act in an arbitrary fashion).
However, to properly model the Internet, in which
distributed computation and autonomous agents prevail, one must also
consider selfish agents that maximize their own utility.
To cope with selfish agents, system designers must develop
mechanisms in which cooperation is in each agent's self interest; we
call such mechanisms "incentive-compatible." These
lectures will first introduce the audience to the economic theory that
forms the basis for the design and analysis of incentive-compatible
Internet algorithms. It will then review previous results in this area,
including those on interdomain routing and
multicast cost sharing. Finally, it will
present several promising research directions and pose some specific
open problems.
## Tim RoughgardenComputer Science
Division, ## The Price of AnarchyThe
"price of anarchy"---the worst-case ratio between the social objective
function value of an equilibrium and that
of a social optimum---is an increasingly popular measure of the extent
to which competition approximates cooperation. It
is a rendezvous of the idea of an equilibrium, an idea fundamental to
game theory, and the concept of approximation, which is ubiquitous in
optimization and theoretical
computer science. In
this tutorial, we
will survey several mathematical techniques for bounding the price of
anarchy, along with the applications to which they have been
successfully applied. ## Rakesh VohraMEDS Department,
Kellogg ## Linear Inequalities and Mechanism DesignA
mechanism is a black box that takes as inputs the preferences of a set
of agents and outputs an allocation of resources. The subject of
mechanism design is concerned with the existence (or non-existence) of
mechanisms that satisfy `desirable' properties. For example, do agents
have the incentive to truthfully report their preferences? Is it
non-discriminatory in the sense that the outcome does not depend on the
names of agents? The
literature has two strands. The first, called Social Choice, beginning
with Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, makes very few assumptions about
preferences, but limits the choice of mechanisms. The second,
associated with Auction Theory, places severe restrictions on
preferences but enlarges the set of mechanisms considered. In both
cases the class of desired mechanisms can be described by a system of
linear inequalities or linear programs. Existence or non-existence can
be deduced by an appeal to the Farkas
lemma. In these two lectures I will give two examples of this: The
first is an application to Social Choice and the second to Auction
Theory. References: Sethuraman, Teo,
and Vohra,
`Integer Programming and Arrovian Social
Muller
and Vohra, `On Dominant Strategy
Mechanisms', 2003 Lecture
Notes (in preparation) |